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'A Sort of Destiny': The Multi-Jurisdictional 
Response to Sewage Pollution 
in the Great Lakes, 1900-1930 
JENNIFER READ 
ABSTRACT: 
At the turn of the twentieth century, 
water pollution was the primary 
vector spreading waterborne disease 
and a public health issue. In the 
Great Lakes basin, unprecedentedly 
high mortality from typhoid fever 
prompted a conference of federal 
and provincial public health offi-
cials in 1910. Three related initia-
tives resulted: the provincial 
government amended the Public 
Health Act in 1912; federal legisla-
tors attempted to develop national 
pollution control legislation 
between 1912 and 1915; the Inter-
national Joint Commission investi-
gated cross boundary pollution in 
1912 and recommended a conven-
tion to control it. Of the three initia-
tives, only the provincial Public 
Health Act amendments were carried 
to fruition. By 1915, the almost uni-
versal adoption of chlorine treat-
ment for municipal water supplies 
effectively controlled waterborne 
disease and there was no longer a 
perceived need for further action. 
RÉSUMÉ: 
Au tournant du vingtième siècle, la 
pollution de l'eau était le premier 
vecteur de propagation des maladies 
hydriques et une menace à la santé 
publique. En 1910, le taux de mor-
talité imputable à la fièvre typhoïde 
atteignait, dans le bassin des Grands 
Lacs, un niveau sans précédent, ce 
qui incita les responsables fédéraux 
et provinciaux de la santé publique 
à organiser un congrès sur la ques-
tion. Trois initiatives connexes en 
résultèrent : amendement de la Pu-
blic Health Act en 1912 par le gou-
vernement provincial; tentative de 
mise au point d'une législation na-
tionale de contrôle de la pollution 
entre 1912 et 1915 par les législa-
teurs fédéraux et en 1912, enquête 
sur la pollution transfrontière par la 
Commission mixte internationale 
qui recommanda l'élaboration 
d'une convention afin de contrôler 
la pollution. De ces trois initiatives, 
seuls les amendements à la Public 
Health Act se concrétisèrent. En 
1915, suite à l'adoption quasi uni-
verselle du traitement au chlore des 
réserves d'eau municipales, on avait 
réussi à contrôler efficacement la 
propagation des maladies hydriques 
et on ne sentait plus le besoin de 
prendre d'autres mesures à cet effet. 
Scientia canadensis, Volume 22-23 103 
In the neighbourhood of cities and large towns, it has come to 
be thought that a river foul with sewage is inevitable, and it is 
more difficult to abolish or limit the evil when the principal 
offenders are known to be the municipal governing bodies. 
Rich and poor, therefore, calmly view the existence and perpet-
uation of the nuisance and submit to it as a sort of destiny. 
— Commission of Conservation, Public Health 
Conference, October 19101 
In October 1910 the Canadian Commission of Conservation hosted a 
conference of federal and provincial public health practitioners to 
address the Dominion's appalling typhoid fever mortality rates. 
That year the Canadian death rate from the disease was 35.5 per 
one hundred thousand persons. When compared to other coun-
tries, such as Scotland with 6.2, or England and Wales with 11.2 
deaths per one hundred thousand people, clearly Canada faced a 
serious problem. Among western nations, only the United States 
surpassed Canada's grim statistics.2 
While the medical community knew that water polluted by the 
faeces of typhoid carriers and patients was the primary vector 
spreading the disease, efforts to combat it were foiled by municipal 
politicians' reluctance to address the problem. At the turn of the 
century most people considered sewage fouled rivers and lakes in 
the vicinity of human settlement inevitable. This was an assump-
tion that provincial and federal public health officials challenged. 
They were part of the wave of new professionals who attempted to 
instill uniformity and assert more centralized control over 
municipalities' social and physical infrastructure.3 The profession 
itself underwent an important transformation at the provincial 
level in 1912 that was, in part, prompted by provincial efforts to 
combat typhoid fever. At that time the part-time physicians who 
acted as local medical officers of health were replaced by provin-
cially appointed doctors with public health training who answered 
directly to the provincial Board of Health. 
Federal and provincial public health officials at the 1910 confer-
ence discussed which level of government was responsible for man-
aging water pollution, specifically raw sewage, and how that 
management would take place. At this time the focus was not upon 
curbing pollution for its own sake; health officials focused instead 
on how to stop the spread of disease. Sewage was an important 
vector, therefore controlling pollution would control disease. 
The government health officials attending the conference ham-
mered out a tripartite plan to manage water pollution. As a first 
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step, they recommended the provinces amend their public health 
acts to take more rigorous control over the design and mainte-
nance of municipal water and sewerage works. At the same time, it 
was clear that pollution in interprovincial waterways was beyond 
the capability of provincial governments to manage, so the confer-
ence recommended uniform national legislation to address that 
issue. Finally, conference attendees urged the federal government 
to work with its US counterpart through the International Joint 
Commission (IJC) and address pollution in the Great Lakes basin 
where the Canadian incidence of typhoid fever was highest. 
Over the next five years federal and provincial politicians and 
public health officials attempted to implement the recommenda-
tions of the 1910 conference. Of all the suggestions, those devised 
for the provincial level were the most successfully executed. 
Despite the steady interest of federal legislators between 1912 and 
1915, proponents of national legislation were not able to get it 
through the House of Commons. Similarly, the two federal govern-
ments considered a draft convention addressing the problem dur-
ing the 1920s but allowed it to lapse in 1929. 
An examination of the events precipitated by the 1910 public 
health conference will help explain why the typhoid issue, which 
had generated such initial interest, failed to maintain its hold long 
enough for either federal or international action to occur. As with 
many things the answer lies in timing. Although senators and MPs 
considered pollution legislation as early as 1912, a number of 
factors slowed federal legislative action for several years. This gave 
the opposition time to consolidate and force a further delay. Simi-
larly, the two federal governments were slow to consider the IJC's 
pollution convention during the 1920s. While federal and interna-
tional efforts moved slowly, Ontario public health officials took 
advantage of changes made to the provincial Public Health Act in 
1912 to assert more control over municipal water filtration and 
treatment plants. While they were relatively ineffective at promot-
ing the construction of sewage treatment facilities, the introduc-
tion of chlorine treatment for municipal water supplies enabled 
public health officials to significantly reduce the incidence of 
typhoid fever in the Great Lakes basin by the mid-1920s. This 
significantly curbed pressure on the federal government both to 
pass national pollution legislation and to conclude the convention 
with the United States. 
The typhoid problem public health officials confronted in 1910 
had emerged from a number of factors, but especially the combina-
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tion of rapid urban growth and inability of local authorities to 
provide adequate water and sewerage facilities. Provincial efforts to 
ameliorate the situation were hampered by an inadequate legal and 
regulatory framework, resulting in an inability to impose uni-
formly safe standards in all communities. As the situation deterio-
rated, municipal politicians proved increasingly unwilling to 
cooperate with provincial health authorities. 
Ontario's urban growth concentrated in the Great Lakes basin, 
where development on the U.S. side also outpaced water and sew-
erage capacity and contributed to the typhoid problem. The basin 
had proved an ideal location for industrial towns and cities, sur-
rounded by rich agricultural land and linked to the resource-laden 
north and west by railroad and steamship. These factors, combined 
with relatively easy and cheap access to the rest of the world 
allowed industrial enterprise on both sides of the lakes to boom. 
Plans to enlarge harbours and channels to accommodate ocean-
going vessels promised even more ships would come into the Great 
Lakes system.4 Tourism also increased in economic importance 
after 1900. Every year, scenic spots along the system, such as the 
Thousand Islands, received more visitors and boat traffic.5 
Most cities in the Great Lakes basin drew their water supply from 
surface waters around them. Water and sewerage systems, if they 
existed at all, were often poorly designed, providing inadequate 
treatment and serving very few in the community. Water services 
were extended first to the industrial, commercial and wealthy resi-
dential neighbourhoods to protect valuable property against fire. 
Other members of the community were often left to draw their 
water from questionable water sources or polluted wells.6 
Sewerage systems consisted of a small number of trunk lines 
which gathered sewage from those homes and businesses located 
along them. These systems were designed to release the untreated 
effluent downstream from the community's water intake pipe in an 
effort to maintain the integrity of the water supply. Although this 
proved a relatively successful practice for the originating commu-
nity, the untreated effluent presented a menace to anyone drawing 
water downstream from the sewage outfall. While sanitary engi-
neers relied upon dilution and oxidization to neutralize the efflu-
ent before it reached the intake pipe of the next community 
downstream, factors such as volume and distance made reliance 
upon these methods very risky. With ever increasing population 
density along the Great Lakes connecting channels, especially the 
St. Clair, Detroit and Niagara Rivers, such practices led to the 
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basin-wide high infection and death rates from typhoid fever (see 
Table One). In some locations, notably Chicago, fighting typhoid 
fever sent engineers to heroic lengths such as reversing the flow of 
the Chicago River to divert sewage away from the city's intake.7 
Ontario public health officials' desire to control the growing 
incidence of typhoid fever formed a significant aspect of their 
struggle against local interests during the late nineteenth century. 
At this time, provincial officials attempted to assert central control 
over all issues related to public health by emphasizing the greater 
efficiency and scientific expertise of trained public health practi-
tioners.8 Peter Bryce, an Ontario born and educated doctor who 
had undertaken advanced studies in Paris and Edinburgh, was 
appointed the first provincial medical officer of health by the first 
permanent Board of Health in 1882.9 Led by Bryce, the provincial 
Board investigated cases of disease and offered advice to local 
officials but, with very few local boards to carry out its directives, 
this central Board remained relatively ineffective. In 1884, there-
fore, the provincial Legislative Assembly amended the Public Health 
Act to make local boards compulsory and responsible for carrying 
out the regulations Bryce and the central Board established on a 
range of matters intended to keep areas of human habitation clean 
and disease free.10 
Public health practitioners knew that protecting municipal 
water sources by collecting and safely disposing of sewage helped 
mitigate the spread of waterborne disease. Unfortunately, the water 
and sewerage facilities required to prevent these diseases received 
little priority as communities developed because they were long 
term financial commitments of little political value. This attitude 
frustrated Bryce, who declared, "[t]he fiction was apparently 
believed that all the sanitary requirements of a well organized 
community would spring up full armed like Athene from the brow 
of Jupiter."11 
Equally frustrated by apparent municipal indifference, Bryce's 
successor, Dr. Charles Hodgetts, repeatedly urged the provincial 
Board to seek "direct oversight and control of all [municipal] water 
systems, together with the streams, lakes and rivers from which the 
supplies are taken." The Board, he believed, should have the power 
to prosecute polluters, monitor water quality and hold corpora-
tions or owners of systems responsible for the protection of their 
water's purity.12 Hodgetts was also frustrated by his inability to 
enforce provisions in the Act which obliged municipal authorities 
to submit plans for new or enlarged water or sewerage treatment 
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TABLE ONE 
TYPHOID DEATH RATES 
Adjusted to an Average per 100 000 Population 
J Port Arthur 72 178 5;21 (1916) 26 
J Sarnia 33 101 34 21 
1 Windsor 42 49 14 8 
1 Niagara Falls 72 (1906) 60 9;27 (1916) 20 
Welland NA 85 14 21 
| St. Catharines NA 24;71 (1911) 0;22(1916) 5 (1919) 
| Hamilton 20 15 6 9 
1 Toronto 18 46 2 2 
1 Belleville 21 50 63 26 
| Kingston 38 78 28 7 
1 Brockville 22 11 162 epidemic 22 
Cornwall 30 64 77 144 epidemic S 
- Public health professionals considered a mortality rate at or above 24 per 
100 000 a signal that the municipal water supply had been compromised. 
Sources: IJC. Progress Report, 1914, 358-59 and Ontario Board of Health. 
Thirty-ninth Annual Report of the Provincial Board of Health of Ontario, Can-
ada for the Year 1920 (Toronto: King's Printer, 1921), 116-117. 
facilities for Board approval. In many cases, he learned of new 
works only after they had been completed. But even if the plans 
had been submitted for Board approval prior to their construction, 
he had no way to ensure that Board ordered changes were incorpo-
rated into the project.13 To complicate matters further, municipal 
politicians rarely looked beyond their town limits. As Hodgetts 
charged, municipal politicians "care nothing as to how great a 
nuisance...[their] sewage effluent may be to others, or how many 
lives may be lost by reason of typhoid carried to adjoining munici-
palities."14 
Municipal governments were willing to defy provincial direc-
tives to spend money on matters which they believed were too 
expensive or unnecessary for their community, such as sewage 
treatment facilities.15 Many municipal officials believed that to 
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oblige a city to "purify its sewage, so that it will not affect prejudi-
cially the stream into which it is discharged is to place an embargo 
upon the growth of that town."16 Most regarded sewage treatment 
plants as "an expense forced upon the municipality for the benefit 
of the surrounding township. It would be much easier for the town 
to empty its sewage as formerly into a river or creek/' and let the 
next town downstream worry about its water supply.17 From this 
perspective the cost of treating effluent did not offer a direct advan-
tage to the community; instead, it benefited the next town down-
stream. How could municipal politicians justify spending their 
ratepayers' taxes for the advantage of another community? 
At the same time, however, the importance of maintaining the 
community's good reputation dominated local politics, and politi-
cians did anything they could to preserve the town's real or illusory 
health. One of the more effective strategies was to locate better 
sources of water for the public supply. Initially community health 
could be protected by simply collecting all the sewage and releas-
ing it well downstream from the intake pipe. By the turn of the 
century increasing population density had ensured that few surface 
water sources in populated areas of the Great Lakes basin were safe. 
Sanitary engineers urged municipal leaders to invest in water filtra-
tion systems when safe alternatives had been exhausted. They had 
determined that one dollar spent on water treatment was as effec-
tive as ten spent on sewage purification — obviously a solution as 
good for the public purse as for public health. Relatively early in 
the century municipal politicians, with the support of sanitary 
engineers, had already decided that focusing on water treatment 
was the best way to respond to the disease problems caused by 
sewage pollution.18 How ironic that in treating their drinking water 
most communities were treating another's sewage. 
When disease did break out, local leaders took great pains to 
keep the news quiet. This was an age when every city and town 
competed to attract manufacturing and service industries. Such 
pride made even local public health officers hesitant to pursue 
their responsibilities fully if they might undermine their 
community's prestige or thwart an opportunity for growth, as 
would happen if their town became known as a disease-prone 
locale.19 A significant manifestation of this attitude was the ten-
dency for local public health officers to under-report incidence of 
disease, especially typhoid fever. When they did inform the central 
Board, local health officers were quick to point out that many of 
the typhoid cases reported in their communities had originated 
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outside the city limits, but that treatment in their hospitals neces-
sitated inclusion in their returns.20 
Even when health officers were conscientious in their duty, they 
could be undermined by other community members. Until well 
into the twentieth century, local medical officers only worked 
part-time, and most supplemented their income in private practice 
which depended upon personal popularity for success. If a doctor 
was too enthusiastic in executing his provincial office, his reputa-
tion within the community could suffer for "knocking the town." 
Local health officers found their medical colleagues hesitant to 
report cases of contagious or infectious diseases for similar rea-
sons.21 Reluctance to admit that disease was a problem meant that 
the public pressure necessary to ensure expenditure on adequate 
sanitary infrastructure rarely coalesced at the local level. 
Rapid urban growth at the turn of the century exacerbated 
already dangerous water management practices which focused on 
muncipal water quality rather than sewage treatment. While pro-
vincial public health officials could point out the dangers inherent 
in those practices, they had no effective means to alter them. 
Responsibility for constructing sewage treatment plants rested with 
local governments where politicians were reluctant to spend tax 
dollars on expensive infrastructure that would not benefit the 
immediate community. Instead, they focused on protecting the 
water supply, by locating safe sources and building filtration plants. 
By 1910 the emphasis on treating and protecting water supplies 
was an established strategy for combatting water borne diesase. 
This strategy had an important flaw: municipal water rarely 
served the entire community thus compromising its effectiveness. 
Although sewage treatment promised substantially safer waters, 
especially as treatment technology developed, local politicians' 
reluctance to adopt this solution was almost intractable. The pro-
vincial Board of Health failed to secure the level of centralized 
control over pollution they required to manage disease. Conse-
quently the typhoid problem escalated after the turn of the century 
(see Table One). More and more people crowded into towns and 
cities which did not have the water or sewerage infrastructure in 
place to sustain growing populations. In some cases the inhabitants 
were then forced to draw their water from streams and wells 
reduced to little more than open sewers. 
The steady increase in typhoid fever mortality proved alarming 
to Senators in Ottawa. Their response, assigning the newly created 
standing committee on public health to investigate pollution in 
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March 1909, precipitated the 1910 Dominion-wide conference. 
After a study lasting the better part of a year, the committee con-
cluded that the country required some form of legislation to man-
age the problem. However, it was at a loss about the form it should 
take and from what body it should emanate. At the same time 
(March 1910), Ottawa Senator Napoleon Belcourt introduced an 
amendment to the Protection of Navigable Waters Act. Pollution 
from Aylmer, Quebec threatened Ottawa's water supply but the 
capital city had no recourse. While provincial public health offi-
cials had some control over their own cities, in the case of pollu-
tion from communities in other provinces there was no higher 
authority to which they could appeal. Belcourt hoped his proposed 
amendment, designed to prevent pollution from sanitary and 
industrial wastes nation-wide, would help rectify the situation.22 
Not certain that this was the correct solution either, the Senate 
health committee recommended that the newly created Canadian 
Commission of Conservation, as a body which represented both 
the federal and provincial governments, host a conference to con-
sider the issue of pollution abatement generally and Belcourt's 
legislation specifically.23 
The Commission of Conservation's Public Health committee 
accordingly invited federal and provincial health officials to 
Ottawa for a two day meeting in October 1910. Among the atten-
dees were provincial health officers from all provinces except Que-
bec, including Dr. John McCullough who had just replaced Charles 
Hodgetts as provincial secretary of Ontario. Hodgetts was also there 
as medical advisor to the new Commission of Conservation along 
with the other members of its Public Health committee, including 
the chairman, Edmund Osier, Minister of Agriculture Sydney 
Fisher, MP Henri Béland and Commission Chairman Clifford 
Sifton. Federal officials attending included Frederick Monti-
zambert, Director General of Public Health, and Peter Bryce, who 
was now Chief Medical Officer of the Immigration Branch. Other 
federal representatives included the deputy minister of Labour, a 
member of the army medical corps, the pathologist from the cen-
tral experimental farm and a representative of Inland Revenue. 
Senator George DeVeber, who chaired the Senate Public Health 
committee, also attended the meeting which brought together 
many of the experts his committee had consulted the previous 
year.24 
From the outset, Clifford Sifton urged attendees to view the 
gathering as a business meeting designed to achieve concrete rec-
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ommendations for Parliament; rather than another opportunity to 
exchange scientific information. The problems associated with 
water pollution, as the Senate committee and Ontario public 
health officials had already discovered, were not simple. Sifton 
foresaw potential jurisdictional problems because of the constitu-
tional distinction between federal responsibility for navigable 
waters and provincial responsibility for all others. The trick would 
be in conceiving an effective and enforceable legislative solution.25 
An initial general discussion clarified the issues. Interjurisdic-
tional waters proved to be the most significant question the confer-
ence addressed. Provincial representatives readily admitted that 
managing pollution in interprovincial and international rivers and 
lakes was beyond them. For instance, what could Alberta do about 
pollution which crossed the border from Montana via the St. Mary 
river? When Aylmer polluted the water above Ottawa, who could 
the city approach to rectify the situation? Provincial medical 
health officers were unanimous in the desire to see a regime of 
uniform federal legislation and regulations as well as international 
co-operation to address the problems which they could not man-
age.26 
After the issues had been defined, attendees broke into smaller 
committees to consider specific issues. The water pollution com-
mittee recommended that the provinces add a clause to their 
health acts to make it impossible for municipalities to finance 
water and sewerage systems without the consent of their provincial 
board of health. They urged provincial authorities to supervise 
municipal water and sewerage installations to ensure they func-
tioned properly. Further, the committee recommended the federal 
government pass legislation to prevent raw sewage, garbage and 
factory wastes from being released into navigable waters and tribu-
tary streams. They appended draft legislation, supplied by Senator 
DeVeber, for Parliament's consideration. They also recommended 
that provincial legislative assemblies pass special legislation to pre-
vent conflict with the proposed federal law. Finally, the committee 
urged the federal government to cooperate with the United States 
government to prevent further pollution of international waters.27 
Early in 1911 the Commission of Conservation sent the recom-
mendations of the water pollution committee to the secretaries and 
commissioners of the provincial public health boards for their 
consideration. Replies from Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, 
Ontario, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia enthusiastically 
endorsed the recommendations and all pledged to do as much as 
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possible to implement the recommendations. The Quebec Deputy 
Attorney General indicated that the numerous important ques-
tions raised in the report would be carefully considered by his 
government.28 
Although the provinces were eager to cooperate with federal 
initiatives, other observers were less optimistic about the success of 
national pollution abatement measures. An editorialist in The 
Globe wondered what the best solution to the typhoid problem 
would be. While public health practitioners advocated sewage 
treatment as the best way to prevent typhoid from spreading, the 
editorialist felt obliged to point out, "the practice of pouring crude 
sewage into the great lakes [sic] and rivers has too firm a hold to be 
stamped out quickly." As long as pollution continued unabated, 
Canadians required an alternative: either unpolluted sources of 
water or better water treatment facilities. Tellingly, the writer pre-
dicted that "in another decade it will be impossible to find an 
up-to-date community along the shores of the inland waters that 
invites typhoid by pumping untreated water into the mains."29 The 
writer stopped short of addressing the next logical question: with a 
safe and efficient treatment for water, why bother controlling sew-
age pollution? 
Despite these misgivings, the Dominion Public Health confer-
ence had far reaching consequences. The conference's recommen-
dations called for responses at the provincial, federal and 
international levels. With the added weight of the conference rec-
ommendations, Ontario's Legislative Assembly consolidated its 
public health legislation under a new Public Health Act in 1912 and 
included the clause designed by the water pollution committee to 
prevent municipalities from evading water and sewage treatment 
responsibilities. Prior to 1912 the Ontario Board had the power to 
order remedial water or sewerage works to address local health 
problems and could offer advice on the facilities. It had no power 
over what the community then chose to install, nor did it have 
much influence on the speed with which the solution was effected. 
The 1912 changes prevented municipalities from issuing deben-
tures for water and sewerage works without the written approval of 
the Board's chairman and secretary. The amendment also made 
ongoing maintenance and improvements to local systems compul-
sory.30 The 1912 Act blocked the two most significant means avail-
able to a community for circumventing central directives. No 
longer could a municipal government install substandard, and 
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therefore less costly, systems; nor could newly constructed facilities 
be left unattended or inoperative. 
The Act also addressed the problems associated with local medi-
cal officers of health, when it divided the province into seven 
health districts — London, Palmerston, Hamilton, Peterborough, 
Kingston, North Bay and Fort William. The provincial board then 
appointed individuals specifically trained as public health profes-
sionals to supervise the sanitary work in each region. These district 
health officers were full-time provincial employees, freed of the 
need to maintain private practice, and presumably committed to 
uniform standards across the province.31 Their role included inves-
tigating incidence of disease, determining its cause, and ordering 
remedial measures. This included the new practice of treating 
municipal water supplies with chlorine. 
The use of chlorine originated in Britain in 1897 as an emer-
gency measure when muncipal water supplies had been exposed 
temporarily to questionable sources. In the United States, on the 
other hand, it was embraced as a permanent solution after Jersey 
City sanitary engineers completed a sucessful installation in 
1908.32 Some public health professionals, such as Charles Hodgetts, 
worried that permanent chlorine treatment would encourage pol-
lution by focusing attention on water purification rather than 
sewage treatment.33 But these people were in the minority because 
chlorine was plentiful, inexpensive and, when used properly, 
harmless to human health. All in all, chlorine appeared to be the 
ideal solution. 
The new Ontario Public Health Act embraced the recommenda-
tions made at the 1910 Dominion Public Health conference and, in 
one fell swoop, met provincial secretaries' longstanding concerns. 
It reduced local control over the measures a community might take 
to ameliorate a pollution problem, giving the Ontario Board of 
Health power to order any municipality to construct remedial 
water or sewerage works. This included the installation of chlorine 
treatment for public water supplies. The design of the system had 
to meet the Board's approval before money could be raised to build 
it. Further, the Act made ongoing supervision of water and sewer-
age installations mandatory. The 1912 Public Health Act was 
designed to control water borne disease and, in the process, proved 
one of the most effective tools for water pollution control then 
available to any level of government in Canada.34 
The Dominion Public Health Conference also stimulated a 
response at the federal level. Among its recommendations had 
114 'A Sort of Destiny7 
been a call for uniform national pollution abatement legislation, a 
draft of which had been included with the conference report. The 
bill proscribed the pollution of all waters in the country, not just 
the navigable streams over which Parliament had jurisdiction 
under the British North America Act It banned the release of raw 
sewage as well as poisonous, noxious and colour-altering industrial 
effluents and mine tailings. All persons, corporations and govern-
ments found contravening these pollution prevention measures 
would be liable for both initial fines and cumulative sanctions for 
every day after which the offence continued.35 
The Senate and House of Commons each produced a member 
who championed the pollution control legislation. Once again the 
Senate advocate was Napoleon Belcourt, the Ottawa senator whose 
1910 proposal had helped prompt the public health conference. In 
1911 he enthusiastically introduced the legislation provided by the 
conference's water pollution committee and staunchly defended it 
in the Senate until it finally passed and went to the House of 
Commons in 1912. Belcourt's Commons counterpart was Selkirk 
MP George Bradbury. Bradbury's initial concern had been for the 
deplorable condition of the Red River in his home constituency 
north of Winnipeg, but he soon embraced the larger national 
pollution problem. He first introduced legislation which the House 
of Commons debated along with the Senate bill in 1912 and 
re-introduced it in each of the following three sessions. 
The debate over the Pollution of Navigable Waters bill followed 
similar lines in both houses over the next four years. Opponents of 
the legislation believed it was expensive and impracticable.36 Some 
argued that pollution abatement measures would unduly restrict 
the growth of smaller, inland communities if Parliament curtailed 
their ability to pollute at will, and the impact might well be 
national in scope. Canada, it was suggested, was not yet at the stage 
where it could afford to consider such legislation. Besides, as Mon-
treal senator Henry Cloran argued, Canada had "rivers and lakes 
large enough to contain all the refuse that the inhabitants of the 
country could discharge into them, without danger of contagion to 
the people."37 Clearly the focal problem was not pollution itself 
but the impact it had upon human health and some legislators 
would deny that in favour of economic gains. 
Another group of opponents represented the interests of mari-
time communities which discharged their sewage into tidal salt 
water. In their view uniformly applied national legislation would 
place an unfair burden on these municipalities if they were forced 
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unnecessarily to treat sewage being released into water that could 
not be used to provide drinking water.38 Other legislators believed 
that such sweeping legislation was ultra vires for the federal Parlia-
ment.39 
In rebuttal, proponents argued that the proposed legislation fell 
within federal purview under the residual power of the British North 
America Act Furthermore, provincial governments were clearly 
unable to manage the problem in bodies of water entirely within 
their borders, let alone in interprovincial or international ones. As 
Belcourt argued, "if we are going to split hairs and allow the 
community to die by hundreds and thousands from preventable 
diseases such as typhoid fever, simply because of the question of 
jurisdiction...it is about time the community should know it and 
urge parliament to provide some remedy."40 Among those who 
supported this opinion were the Minister of Marine and Fisheries, 
John D. Hazen, and Minister of Agriculture, Martin Burell. Both 
ministers' portfolios gave them particular interest in pollution 
abatement legislation — Hazen for the obvious benefit to fisheries 
that such a measure would provide, and Burell because his depart-
ment housed the federal public health service.41 As for those who 
argued the Pollution of Navigable Waters bill was impracticable, 
Belcourt and Bradbury pointed out that the problems of how and 
where to implement the legislation could easily be addressed by the 
people who made the regulations.42 
Despite strong arguments in the bill's favour and significant 
investigation in select committee, proponents of the legislation 
were unable to override opposition. When Bradbury again intro-
duced the bill to the Commons in 1915, Hazen, formerly its 
staunch supporter, now urged that nothing be done until the 
International Joint Commission published its report on boundary 
waters pollution, expected imminently. He had heard that the 
report would "be of a very drastic character" and he did not want 
Parliament to pass conflicting legislation.43 Thomas Chase 
Casgrain, Postmaster General and until recently chairman of the 
IJC's Canadian Section, echoed Hazen;s concern asserting that leg-
islation passed prior to the Commission's report would be a 
"breach of faith."44 
The ministers' speeches signalled a sea-change for the govern-
ment. Regional and municipal opposition had grown so strong 
over the previous year that it was not politically astute to pass the 
legislation at that time. In fact maritime municipalities met during 
the summer of 1915 to demonstrate their opposition to the legisla-
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tion and to lobby their MPs to vote against it. Approaching the end 
of his first mandate, Prime Minister Borden was anxious to avoid 
contentious issues which might raise speculation about an immin-
ent election.45 Instead, the government took refuge behind the 
IJC's pollution investigation and delayed a decision on legislation 
until the Commission reported. 
By 1915 no real answer to the question of responsibility for water 
pollution control had yet been reached. Although the Ontario gov-
ernment had gained a significant advantage in its fight against 
reluctant municipal governments with the amended and consoli-
dated Public Health Act in 1912, local politicians still believed their 
obligation did not extend beyond the immediate community. 
Their strong preference for water treatment over sewage purifica-
tion meant that raw sewage continued to pour into the province's 
rivers and lakes. Strong municipal lobbying against the Pollution of 
Navigable Waters bill, especially from the Maritimes, curtailed fed-
eral efforts to halt pollution in 1915. 
As the House of Commons decided to set aside the Pollution of 
Navigable Waters bill, the International Joint Commission was pur-
suing a Great Lakes water pollution investigation that had begun in 
1912.46 On 1 August that year, the two federal governments 
invoked the Commission's investigatory function and asked it to 
determine the extent, causes and location of pollution in boundary 
waters which extended to and affected the other side in contraven-
tion of Article 4 of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty. They asked 
the IJC to recommend remedial measures to return the water to a 
sanitary condition suitable for domestic use while protecting all 
interests on both sides of the boundary.47 
The subsequent study was the largest bacteriological investiga-
tion undertaken anywhere in the world to that point.48 Upon the 
advice of a number of prominent sanitary engineers and public 
health professionals, the Commission focused on the Great Lakes 
Basin and tested water samples from 1,447 points between Rainy 
River in the west and Cornwall in the east during the summer of 
1913. The tests determined the total amount of organic material, 
both faecal and decaying vegetable matter, in the water. They 
calculated the amount of bacteria able to thrive at human body 
temperature. They established the quantity of the human colon 
bacillus (B. colt) in the water. This latter test was the most specific 
indicator of the presence of human faecal matter and, therefore, 
sewage pollution in the water.49 Based upon these tests, the scien-
tists devised a five-level scale rating surface water quality. This 
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enabled them to determine where pollution crossed the border so 
they could formulate remedial plans for those areas. 
As part of their exercise in determining remedial measures, the 
Commission consulted a number of Canadian and American sani-
tary engineers. They established clear guidelines for raw water 
quality, suggested a basic sewage treatment regime and offered 
their opinion on ways to manage water supply and sewage treat-
ment for lake vessels.50 IJC also held public meetings in September, 
October and November 1914, and again in June and August 1916, 
to determine municipal support for water purification and sewage 
treatment. The Commission wished to ascertain the level of com-
mitment communities were both capable and willing to assume 
before making its final recommendations to the two govern-
ments.51 
The International Joint Commission presented its final report on 
boundary water pollution in September 1918. The document repre-
sented the distillation of five years' investigation, a vast amount of 
accumulated scientific data, detailed reports from advisory engi-
neers, and hours of testimony presented at public hearings. It 
outlined the sources and extent of existing pollution between 
Rainy River and the St. Lawrence River and offered the 
Commission's carefully considered recommendations for remedial 
measures. According to the IJC's findings, the main bodies of the 
Great Lakes, apart from polluted shores, the areas around the 
mouths of rivers, and shipping lanes, were "in a state of almost 
absolute purity," but that these other areas were another story 
altogether.52 The connecting channels of the Great Lakes, espe-
cially in the vicinity of lake and riverside communities, were heav-
ily polluted by raw sewage from both cities and lake vessels. These 
areas, "besides being in places unsightly, malodorous, and abso-
lutely unfit for domestic purposes" posed a considerable danger to 
the health of anyone coming into contact with the water. Munici-
pal directives frequently closed these areas to bathers.53 
The condition of the Detroit River and the Niagara River directly 
contravened the treaty. The city of Detroit released the untreated 
sewage of 850,000 people directly into the Detroit River. At 
Amherstburg, a Canadian town downstream from Detroit, the 
B. coli count reached the incredible figure of 10,392 per 100 cc. of 
water, rendering it unfit for domestic use. The IJC concluded: 
"Beyond question the pollution from Detroit and the towns lower 
down the river crosses the boundary line and affects detrimentally 
health and property on the other side."54 
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On the Niagara River, Buffalo added raw sewage of another 
500,000 people to the water. At the IJC hearings, a resident of 
North Tonawanda, just downstream from Buffalo's sewer outlet, 
recounted how at a recent meeting of the area's "pure water confer-
ence" someone had tied a napkin over a tap and let the water run 
for twenty minutes, after which "the stench of the accumulated 
excreta on that napkin was so strong that you did not want it 
anywhere near your nose." The water of the Niagara River "is not 
fit to be seen or used, much less drunk,"55 Below the Falls, the 
churning action of the whirlpool mixed sewage pollution through-
out the water, grossly contaminating the entire river and a radius of 
eighteen miles into Lake Ontario.56 
While the St. Marys, St. Clair and St. Lawrence rivers were not as 
badly polluted as the other two, they were in a state which defied 
the spirit of the treaty and, if they continued to deteriorate, would 
certainly break it. This situation existed, the IJC asserted, because 
of the indifference of riparian communities to the danger pre-
sented by their raw waste and what the Commission called their 
"ill-directed spirit of economy" which made community leaders 
reluctant to assume the financial burden of remedial measures. The 
result was a situation "generally chaotic, everywhere perilous, and 
in some cases disgraceful."57 
The commissioners felt obliged to point out that the terms of the 
reference from the two federal governments had been unduly 
restrictive, forcing them to make less stringent recommendations 
than they wished. For example, because of the enthusiastic exercise 
of treaty rights to "free and open" navigation of boundary waters, 
the basin's population could and did contract diseases while across 
the border and carried them back to their own side. Similarly, lake 
going vessels were responsible for a significant amount of pollu-
tion, and, while they might not violate the letter of the treaty when 
they released polluted ballast water or raw sewage after crossing the 
boundary line, they did contravene its spirit. In neither case did 
pollution from one side actually cross the border in the water. 
Nonetheless, the results were the same and the situations which 
precipitated them should be addressed.58 There was also the case of 
communities which, by virtue of geography, were far enough away 
from the boundary that their pollution did not actually cross it. 
Nevertheless, they released as much volume of raw sewage as other 
communities located closer to the border and caused equal damage 
to ambient water quality. The commissioners believed that all 
communities polluting boundary waters should be held equally 
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accountable for their situation regardless of the limitations 
imposed by the reference.59 Despite their wish to interpret the 
treaty and pollution reference more broadly and incorporate situa-
tions such as these, the commissioners refrained from stepping 
beyond the limits set for them by the two governments. 
The Commission concluded that remedy for the pollution situa-
tion was both "feasible and practicable/' as well as affordable for all 
border municipalities. For urban offenders, the IJC recommended 
that sewerage works collect and treat sanitary wastes before releas-
ing them into boundary waters. Vessel sewage would be best han-
dled if chemically neutralized before emptying, and ballast water 
should be similarly treated. Garbage and sawmill waste now being 
discharged into boundary waters should be prohibited and indus-
trial waste should be treated as well.60 
Finally, the IJC turned to the questions which had been plaguing 
the provincial and federal governments since early in the century. 
Who was responsible for managing water pollution and how would 
it be accomplished? The current situation did not exist because of 
deliberate ignorance of treaty obligations, but because municipal 
governments on both sides of the border failed to acknowledge the 
extent of their role in polluting boundary waters. While local 
governments had been relatively successful in providing water and 
sewerage collection facilities for the communities under their care, 
the general lack of sewage treatment forced downstream communi-
ties to shoulder increasingly heavy burdens in their effort to pro-
vide safe drinking water. Ideally, all towns should adequately treat 
their sewage before release to avoid overtaxing other communities' 
water filtration systems.61 
In order to achieve uniform treatment standards, the IJC 
believed that a single organisation should be assigned jurisdiction 
over all boundary waters with the power to set effluent quality 
standards. This seemed to be the best answer given municipal 
politicians' concern about the cost of new installations and their 
indifference to the danger created by sewage pollution, as well as 
provincial and federal inability or unwillingness to provide effec-
tive control of the situation. The authority would leave the instal-
lation of remedial works and their financing up to individual 
communities, but would establish the capacity and degree of effi-
ciency for sewage purification facilities. Given the international 
importance of the situation, and the number of existing bodies 
which could claim some jurisdiction over boundary waters, it was 
clear that the authority should be jointly created by the two federal 
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governments. The International Joint Commission recommended 
that it be given the new task since it already had jurisdiction over 
the use and diversion of boundary waters. To ensure it had enough 
authority to carry out the assignment, the Commission also asked 
for the power to create rules and regulations, give orders and 
directions as it saw fit, as well as to employ the engineers and other 
experts it deemed necessary.62 
In March 1919 the two governments asked the IJC to draft a 
convention or concurrent legislation to confer the "necessary 
authority to remedy the existing conditions of pollution" identi-
fied in the final report. In the commissioners' opinion, the draft 
they finally produced met that charge but they warned the govern-
ments that the powers were "not sufficiently wide...to fully and 
adequately remedy all the objectionable conditions" that existed in 
the boundary waters. Once again the IJC reiterated its argument for 
a broader reading of the 1909 treaty. Where gross pollution existed 
on one side of the boundary it did not, in the Commission's 
opinion, actually have to cross the boundary and affect the water 
on the other side to injure health and property. Yet under the 
wording of the governments' request and the subsequent conven-
tion, such instances would be beyond the Commission's scope. The 
commissioners were also worried that the convention did not 
include preventative measures. They would not be able to address a 
pollution problem until it had actually contravened the treaty. In 
their view it was neither efficient nor effective to wait until pollu-
tion had crossed the boundary before initiating remedial measures. 
In its 1920 letter of transmittal the IJC urged the governments to 
reconsider the scope of the request and give the Commission the 
necessary power to "maintain boundary waters in as healthful a 
condition as practicable."63 
After a few minor changes to the draft, the Canadian govern-
ment was prepared to accept the convention. The American gov-
ernment was more concerned about the possibility of concluding 
an agreement which was too closely linked to the Boundary Waters 
Treaty and in 1926 presented the Canadians with an alternative 
draft independent of the 1909 treaty.64 Because the new draft 
involved several Canadian departments, including Marine, Inte-
rior, and Health, it was circulated among them to obtain their 
opinion. By March 1928 none of the affected federal departments, 
the International Joint Commission, nor the Oil Pollution Com-
mittee had taken further action on the draft. Prodded again by 
External Affairs, both Marine and Interior replied within days that 
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they had no objections to the convention and the Department of 
Health followed suit at the end of April. By May the Canadian 
section of the IJC had also been queried and replied that it had 
nothing further to add to the draft. Communication regarding the 
convention then lapsed until 25 October 1929, when the Canadian 
ambassador to Washington, Vincent Massey, again informed Exter-
nal Affairs that the Americans wanted to know if there had been 
any further developments on the draft.65 Four days later the New 
York and Toronto stock markets crashed and the two federal gov-
ernments became preoccupied with the financial panic and subse-
quent Great Depression to the exclusion of less pressing public 
policy issues, including boundary waters pollution. 
While the Depression provides a reasonable explanation for why 
the convention did not proceed after 1929, a better question is why 
it took so long for anything to be done before that date. Neither 
contemporary memoranda nor briefing notes from the 1940s, 
when the convention was resurrected, indicate why either govern-
ment took so long to respond to the various drafts. However, it is 
apparent that just as unacceptably high typhoid mortality levels 
had initially spurred the provincial and federal governments to 
action, the decline in general and epidemic outbreaks of the disease 
equally reduced the demand for a legislative or diplomatic solu-
tion. The IJC itself noted that there had been a marked decline in 
typhoid mortality between its first bacteriological investigation in 
1913 and the release of its final report in 1918.66 Commission 
attributed these statistics to the rapid and comprehensive introduc-
tion of chlorine treated water. Sanitary engineers advocated this 
process because of its effectiveness, efficiency and relatively low 
cost at making bacteria contaminated water safe for domestic use. 
By the time the two federal governments began to consider the 
convention, most Canadian and American communities of any size 
located along the boundary waters had installed a chlorine appara-
tus of some type or were under government order to do so. In 1927 
Ontario's Director of Sanitary Engineering, A.E. Berry, reported that 
there were 140 chlorinating plants in operation in the province, 
representing 52% of all municipalities or 76% of the total Ontario 
municipal water supply. The installation of chlorination systems 
was accompanied by a concerted extension of municipal water 
services to hitherto unreached portions of most communities. This 
combination resulted in 20% fewer cases of typhoid than the aver-
age for the period between 1920 and 1926. Most of those cases had 
either been contracted while the victim vacationed where milk and 
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water were not properly protected, or through food or milk han-
dled by a typhoid carrier. Communities rarely experienced typhoid 
fever in epidemic proportions after 1920 and if they occurred the 
cause was either a chlorination plant which was not working prop-
erly or contaminated milk.67 
Despite the new powers conferred upon the Ontario Board of 
Health under the 1912 Public Health Act, municipal officials 
remained reluctant to construct sewage treatment facilities in their 
communities. In the interest of maintaining amicable provincial-
municipal relations and as an indication of how entrenched local 
power remained, provincial health officials did not use the fullest 
extent of their authority to push this solution. Instead District 
Officers of Health condemned bad water supplies, ordered them to 
be boiled or, more often, supervised the installation of chlorinating 
plants. Therefore public health officials' success in curbing water 
borne disease came primarily from the inroads made in protecting 
the public water supply. Chlorinating municipal water prevented 
the outbreaks of typhoid fever in the epidemic proportion which 
had plagued Ontario cities at the turn of the century. By 1920 
chlorine was the great panacea providing protection for the health 
of increasing numbers of Ontarians. 
As for aborted action at the federal and international levels, 
chlorine's effectiveness at preventing the spread of typhoid fever 
and other water borne disease provided an uncontentious, politically 
palatable way to avoid both proposed national legislation and a 
further binational convention. With maritime communities staunchly 
opposed to the federal Pollution of Navigable Waters bill and munic-
ipal politicians loath to spend money on expensive sewage treat-
ment processes, chlorine was the easiest solution all around. It was 
cost effective, produced immediate results and sanitary engineers 
strongly advocated its use. Sadly, as the health of the people of 
Ontario steadily improved, just as steadily the health of its rivers 
and lakes declined. 
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